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Physicalism and Qualia 
Yukihiro NOBUHARA ????????
? ?
QuaJja， the phenomenal qualities of conscious experiences， have been an obstacle to the 
physicalist view of the world. They don't seem to be reducible to any physical or functional 
properties. Some anti-physicalists thus proposed an aTgument against physicalism by appeal-
ing to the existence of qualia. 1n this paper 1 take up F.] ackson's Knowledge Argument as one 
of those arguments. ]ackson argues that you cannot know what it is like to see red even if you 
Jmow everything physical. But this argument has been attad:ed by many physicalists. They 
argue that Knowledge Argument depends on the ambiguity of the term 'know' and that 
knowing what it is like is not a propositional knowledge but an abili土yof some kind. But E. 
Warner rejects this response. He argues that the physicalist explanation of that ability is 
inconsistent with the incorrigibility thesis that one cannot be mistaken in believing that one 
feels pain. 1 examine these controversies and conclude that although physicalists can reject the 
anti-physicalist objections， they cannot dispeL our persitent conviction that there are 
physicalistically unreducible qualia 
Some physicalists try to deny the existence of qualia. 1 take up D. C. Dennett's powerful 
attempts to eliminate qualia. He argues that our concept of qualia is so confused that there is 
no property corresponding to that concept. Particularly he i1lustrates that one can make 
mistakes about qualia， and concludes from this that qualia are not directly apprehensible in 
consCIousness. But 1 claim that even if one can make mistakes about pain， feeling pain is a 
conscious state and in this sense it is directly apprehensible 1n consciousness. 1 think even 
physicalists must approve the existence of qualia， and so they should be able to locate qualia 
in their physica! world. My conclusion is that qualia sti1l remain the problem to physicalism. 
